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Abstract
The 1998 passage of the Land Revaluation Law in Japan provided reg-
ulatory forbearance to Japanese banks in the form of a regulatory capital
infusion. We test whether this divergence from international bank capital
requirements had an impact on Japanese bank lending behavior. Because
this natural experiment created an exogenous supply shock, we can uti-
lize it to disentangle demand and supply e¤ects in order to determine
the impact on Japanese bank lending in both the U.S. and Japan. We
nd that the infusion of regulatory capital had no aggregate impact on
Japanese bank lending in Japan, but it did change the allocation of loans.
Well-capitalized Japanese banks shifted their lending from low margin,
less capital intensive mortgage lending toward higher yielding, more cap-
ital intensive commercial loans. Moreover, we nd evidence consistent
with a shifting of Japanese bank lending activity away from U.S. lending
(which is predominately real estate based) to domestic lending to fund
manufacturing. Thus, we nd that divergences from international capital
standards have signicant allocative e¤ects on lending, as well as on bank
protability.
1 Introduction
The looming adoption of the Basel II capital requirements in 2008-2009 and the
impending divergence in implementation across countries has again encouraged
debate on the economic impact of bank capital regulations. One of the important
motivations that launched the Basel capital accords in the rst place was the
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recognition that, in a world of international bank competition, there should be a
level regulatory playing eld that harmonized bank capital requirements across
countries. However, as of this writing, U.S. bank regulators appear determined
to diverge from much of the regulatory community in Europe and parts of
Asia in their decision to implement the Basel II Advanced Internal Ratings-
based model for the largest 10-15 U.S. banks only, thereby leaving all other
U.S. nancial institutions under the old Basel I framework1 .
Of course, this is not the rst instance in which national bank regulators
have diverged from the international Basel standards. However, to our knowl-
edge, there has been no academic work assessing the economic impact of these
divergences in national bank capital requirements2 . In this paper, we examine
the lending reaction of Japanese banks both in Japan and the U.S. to an idio-
syncratic change in bank capital requirements that caused a divergence between
Japanese capital requirements and the Basel standards.
On March 31, 1998, at the end of the scal year, the Diet (the Japanese
parliament) passed the Law Concerning the Revaluation of Land. This law al-
lowed Japanese banks to count 45% of the unrealized capital gains on their real
estate holdings, in addition to 45% of the revaluation of their securities, as Tier
2 capital, for the purposes of meeting their bank capital requirements. The real
estate component of this Law was the more substantial part since it impacted
all Japanese banks, whereas the securities component only applied to those
Japanese banks that had international activities. Moreover, since Japanese
banks held considerable land holdings that had been either initially acquired
at much lower costs or obtained upon real estate loan foreclosures, the reval-
uation law provided a signicant capital infusion for Japanese banks that was
not available to non-Japanese banks3 . Thus, Japanese bank regulators essen-
tially granted regulatory capital to Japanese banks in a manner reminiscent
of the supervisory goodwill that was at the heart of the thrift debacle in the
U.S. (See White (1991).) The di¤erence was that the Japanese regulatory cap-
ital infusion was granted to an important sector of the international banking
community, thereby potentially impacting the structure and competitiveness of
1On December 5, 2006, the Federal Reserve released a draft interagency notice of proposed
rulemaking that would o¤er the vast majority of banks, bank holding companies, and savings
associations the option of either continuing to use the existing Basel I-based capital rule or
adopting a more risk sensitive rule, known as Basel IA.Basel IA introduces some additional
risk sensitivity into the Basel I requirements by allowing banks to use loan-to-value ratios in
determining mortgage risk weights, or by increasing the number of risk weight categories, but
did not adopt all of the risk measures proposed in the standardized approach of Basel II.
2The closest paper in this regard is Peek and Rosengren (1997) that examines the impact
of equity price declines on Japanese bank lending in the U.S. Since Japanese banks had long
held equity as a form of hidden reserves, the Basel I provision that permitted 45% of the
unrealized equity gains to be held as Tier 2 capital was relevant to Japanese, but not to U.S.
banks. The dramatic drop in Japanese equity prices during the 1990s acted as a drain on
Japanese bank capital that is qualitatively similar, but opposite in e¤ect, to the regulatory
policy shock that we examine in this paper.
3Subsequent losses in the value of land were not deducted from the banks regulatory
capital positions. Since the banks chose whether to declare an allowance for land revaluation,
the impact of the law was to provide Japanese banks with a one-time permanent, positive
infusion of regulatory capital. There were no instances of negative land revaluations.
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banks throughout the world, whereas the thrift crisis was largely contained in
the U.S. Moreover, to the extent that land was often acquired through real
estate and mortgage lending, the Land Revaluation Law signicantly reduced
Japanese bank capital requirements through both the numerator (by directly
increasing Tier 2 capital levels) and the denominator (by encouraging the shift
towards lower (50%) risk-weight mortgage lending for capital decient banks),
thereby magnifying the impact on bank capital requirements. Thus, in this pa-
per, we examine the impact of this idiosyncratic regulatory policy change on
bank lending behavior in both Japan and the U.S. In particular, we study both
the aggregate, as well as the allocative e¤ects on bank lending in the wake of the
regulatory policy shift.
In addition to contributing to the policy debate regarding the relevance of
a level bank regulatory playing eld, this paper addresses a topic that has been
the subject of a voluminous academic literature the overall impact of capital
regulations on bank liquidity provision and credit creation4 . It is important
to examine both the aggregate and allocative e¤ects of bank capital require-
ments because the Basel II objectives are to leave the banking systems overall
aggregate capital position unchanged. If this objective is achieved, then the
implementation of Basel II may have no impact on either the aggregate supply
of credit or on real investment opportunities5 .
Even if it were true that bank capital requirements have no impact on the
level of bank lending, however it is not necessarily the case that changes in
capital regulation have no impact on real economic activity if there are also al-
locative e¤ects on bank lending behavior. That is, even if the aggregate level of
credit creation is unchanged by capital regulations, an alteration in the distrib-
ution of credit may have real economic implications. The problem in detecting
both these aggregate level and allocative e¤ects has typically been the di¢ culty
in disentangling loan supply from loan demand e¤ects. We take advantage of
the adoption of the Land Revaluation Law, an exogenous event that should have
had no impact on loan demand, in order to focus on bank supply of credit. The
impact of this natural experiment is to create a supply shock that can be used
to investigate both the level and allocative e¤ects of bank capital requirements
in Japan and the U.S.
We nd that passage of the Land Revaluation Law appears to have per-
mitted well-capitalized banks to shift their lending back to higher return, more
capital intensive commercial lending away from lower yield, real estate lending.
Moreover, these banks reduce their overall lending in the U.S. This is consistent
with Peek and Rosengrens (2000) ndings that Japanese bank lending in the
U.S. is predominately secured by real estate. Thus, Japanese banks respond to
regulatory policy incentives and shift their lending to maximize returns subject
to the capital constraints. Those Japanese banks that were relatively capital-
constrained reallocated their lending toward lower yield, real estate lending that
4See Jackson et al (1999) and Allen (2004) for summaries of the extensive literature study-
ing whether the introduction of Basel I caused a credit crunch.
5Of course, recent Qualitative Impact Studies suggest that the adoption of Basel II will
permit large decreases in bank capital requirements.
3
reduced their capital requirements. Well capitalized Japanese banks had a com-
petitive advantage in that they could pursue the higher yield commercial loans,
thereby reducing their lending to the real estate sector and in the U.S. These
results suggest that divergences in capital requirements will have substantial
impacts on bank lending activities across countries.
The paper is organized as follows. A brief literature review appears in Section
2. The data and model are described in Section 3. Empirical results regarding
Japanese bank lending activity in the U.S. and Japan are presented in Section
4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
There are several strands of the literature that are relevant to the proposed
research. We survey the literature on the impact of the Basel Accord on credit
creation and the possibility of a credit crunch. In particular, we consider the lit-
erature that describes the Japanese banking system and its particular incentive
structure.
Most studies that evaluate the impact of Basel 1 Capital Accord have studied
the US banking industry. Proponents of the view that Basel I capital require-
ments induced a credit crunch during the 1990-1991 recession in the US include
Bernanke and Lown (1991), Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Hancock and Wilcox
(1993, 1995), Berger and Udell (1994), Peek and Rosengren (1995a, 1995b), and
Lown and Peristiani (1996). In contrast, opponents (such as Sharpe (1995)) ar-
gue that observed decreases in lending during capital-constrained downturns in
economic activity may be the result of reduced loan demand rather than limita-
tions in credit supply. Johnson (1991) nds that the contraction of bank credit
in 1990 was not homogenous, but was instead determined by local economic
conditions and bank nancial condition. In particular, banks with the lowest
lending growth in 1990 had greater exposure to bad real estate loans, lower S&P
credit ratings and lower capital ratios. Thus, Johnson (1991) nds that compli-
ance with Basel I capital requirements was only one factor limiting the supply
of bank credit in the US during the 1990 recession. This view is supported when
comparing the 1990-1991 recession to the 2000-2001 recession in the US. Stiroh
and Metli (2003) nd that the impact on the quality of bank loan portfolios, as
well as the availability of credit, was much milder in the 2000-2001 recession as
compared to the 1990-1991 recession. Moreover, the impact in 2000-2001 was
localized in certain troubled industries, particularly the telecommunications in-
dustry. Stiroh and Metli (2003) attribute the absence of a signicant 2000-2001
credit crunch to the strong nancial position of the banking system at the start
of the economic downturn, rather than to any regulatory policy changes.
Brinkmann and Horvitz (1995) examine the availability of loan supply in the
wake of the implementation of Basel I without distinguishing between required
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capital and discretionary capital. That is, banks may choose to hold a cushion to
meet regulatory capital requirements. Thus, the imposition of Basel I may have
an impact on loan supply even if all banks met the higher regulatory minimum
capital levels, if banks restrict loan supply in order to build a desired capital
cushion level. Brinkmann and Horvitz (1995) nd that banks with larger capital
surpluses under Basel I increased their lending at twice the rate of banks with
smaller surpluses or decient capital levels suggesting that the Basel I capital
requirements may have been binding due to their impact on discretionary capital
levels. Bugie, et al (2003) suggest that the greater volatility inherent in the
more complex Basel II proposals will exacerbate this tendency toward capital
surpluses.
Hancock and Wilcox (1994a) test bank convergence between regulatory cap-
ital requirements and long run equilibrium, bank-specic economic capital lev-
els. They nd US banks resold single-family home mortgages into the secondary
mortgage backed securities market, but increased their holding of high-yielding
commercial mortgages. Moreover, well-capitalized banks increased their mort-
gage lending more than poorly capitalized banks decreased their lending. Han-
cock and Wilcoxs (1994b) results also do not nd evidence of a shift of high
risk-weighted loans to low risk-weighted securities, as would be the case if im-
plementation of Basel I had induced regulatory capital arbitrage. Thus, their
results are not consistent with a Basel-induced credit crunch. Instead, Hancock
and Wilcox (1994a) explain the shifts in lending as responses to increases in
real estate delinquency rates that led to higher economic capital requirements
during the 1990-1991 period in the US. Thus, they conclude that Basel capital
regulations do not constrain bank-lending behavior as much as the economic
capital targets self-imposed by the banks. Hancock and Wilcox (1997) further
examine the impact of Basel I on the real estate market in the US. However,
in this paper, they nd signicant e¤ects of the capital crunch on real estate
market activity. There was a pronounced drop in commercial real estate loans in
the US during the period following adoption of Basel I. Moreover, the volume of
new single-family real estate loans leveled o¤ during that period. Using national
data, Hancock and Wilcox (1997) nd a signicant decrease in real estate lend-
ing by capital-constrained banks. However, non-bank nancial intermediaries,
such as government-sponsored enterprises, could have lled the gap left by the
banks because they were una¤ected by changes in capital regulations, but they
did not. Hancock and Wilcox (1997) conclude that real economic activity in the
real estate sector was a¤ected by a combination of local economic and banking
conditions. Thus, Hancock and Wilcox (1997) contend that banking sector re-
trenchment during the implementation of Basel I had a real impact on economic
activity in the real estate sector and may have contributed to a credit crunch.
This is particularly compelling because the Japanese experience in the wake of
the introduction of Basel I was exactly the opposite of that in the U.S. Peek
and Rosengren (1992) document the reverse e¤ect of the Hancock and Wilcox
(1997) impact of banking sector retrenchment on real estate market activity.
They nd that the upheaval in the real estate market, following the collapse
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of the New England real estate bubble and the economic slowdown in New
England, seriously impacted the condition of the regions banks, rather than
the reverse causality6 . New England banks experienced a substantial decline
in bank capital due to loan losses emanating from the real estate sector. This
led poorly capitalized banks to reduce their lending more rapidly than well-
capitalized banks. This suggests that Regional banks had excessive exposure
to local economic and market conditions during 1990-1991. Thus, Peek and
Rosengren (1992) contend that it was loan losses, rather than increased Basel I
capital requirements that eroded bank capital levels, thereby inducing a credit
crunch. Jackson et al (1999) state that during the 1980s and 1990s banks tended
to raise their capital levels, although this may have been a response to increased
supervisory or market discipline, higher required levels of economic capital or a
response to more stringent Basel I regulatory capital requirements. Jackson et
al (1999) nd that the average ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of major
banks in the G-10 rose from 9:3% in 1988 to 11:2% in 1996. They conclude that,
although the cause of this overall increase in bank capitalization is ambiguous,
Basel I appears to have been the impetus that induced weakly capitalized banks
to increase their capital positions either through mergers or capital issuance.
Studies using international data demonstrate a similar inconsistency in em-
pirical results. Chiuri et al (2001, 2002) use data from 15 emerging countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hungary, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Paraguay, Poland, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela) to test whether
the introduction of Basel I caused credit to contract 7 . Kang and Stulz (2000)
nd that strong reliance on bank nancing and the lack of alternative sources
of funds in Japan contributed to the decline in rm value displayed by the loss
of more than half of equity value for the typical rm on the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change during 1990 to 1993. Chiuri et al (2002) nd, however, that some of
the reduced lending may have been "ill-advised" and thus the credit contrac-
tion was not necessarily detrimental to the economy. Moreover, the severity
6Duebel (2002) shows that credit loss realizations in the US commercial mortgages peaked
at 250 basis points in 1993 after more than 15 years averaging only 50 basis points. However,
Duebel (2002) argues that it was the "homogenous behavior" of nancial institutions rather
than the "intrinsic character of property markets" that led to this decline in real estate values.
Some examples of this" homogenous behavior" are the resale prices received by the Resolution
Trust Corporation for the sale of thrift assets and the sale of low risk mortgage loans by banks
eager to meet Basel I capital requirements.
7Using a simultaneous equation model, Chiuri et al (2001, 2002) follow Peek and Rosengren
(1995a, 1995b) in attempting to disentangle the supply and demand e¤ects of the reduction
in credit following the introduction of Basel I. That is, higher capital requirements may have
reduced bank supply of credit, but recession and nancial crisis may have reduced the demand
for credit.
Their answer is a¢ rmative, with the aggregate credit contraction exacerbated in countries
that either strictly enforced the Basel I capital requirements or concurrently experienced cur-
rency or nancial crises. Retrenchment in the supply of bank loans may have had detrimental
impacts on the aggregate level of real economic activity in emerging markets. This credit
crunch e¤ect was exacerbated in emerging countries by underdeveloped alternative sources
of nancing. This restriction in the supply of credit is larger for undercapitalized than for
well-capitalized banks.
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of the credit crunch was reduced somewhat for foreign banks, suggesting that
globalization of the banking industry may mitigate the contractionary impact
of Basel capital requirements. However, Chiuri et al (2001, 2002) conclude that
the credit contraction implications of Basel I are the result of increases in ag-
gregate capital levels. To the extent that Basel II does not raise overall capital
requirements, there may not be the same retrenchment in capital supply. In
contrast, Bikker and Hu (2002) nd no support for the credit crunch hypothesis
using an international sample of banks from 26 developed and developing coun-
tries. Since banks typically hold capital in excess of regulatory minimums, they
conclude that capital requirements do not appear to be binding constraints on
loan supply.
There are several studies examining the relationship between capital regula-
tion and bank credit creation in Japan. Japan implemented new guidelines on
bank capital in May 1986 in preparation for increased competition from foreign
banks association with the liberalization of the Japanese nancial sector. At
that time, banks without foreign branches were required to increase their cap-
ital ratios to 4% by March 1991. Those banks with overseas branches had to
increase their capital to 6% by March 19988 .
Evans, et al (1999) nd that Japanese banks focused almost exclusively on
market share maximization during the pre-Basel I period, thereby neglecting
possible risk management and prot maximization policies. The pursuit of
growth at all costs set the stage for the chronic bad loans and undercapitalized
state of the Japanese banking system during the 1990s. In contrast, Evans, et al
(1999) examine European banks and nd that while they also experienced asset
growth at the same time as did the Japanese banks, their risk levels were lower
and their capital levels were higher than those of Japanese banks. Moreover, Ito
and Sasaki (2002) examine 87 major Japanese banks and nd that they reduced
lending in the post Basel I period, as well as issued additional subordinated
debt. Japanese banks issued subordinated debt in order to raise Tier 2 capital
because Tier 1 capital (equity) was too expensive given the dramatic fall in
Japanese equity prices after 1989. Kim and Moreno (1994) trace the reduction
in bank lending during the mid-1980s to mid-1990s to the impact of falling
stock prices on Japanese bank capital levels. Since capital requirements were
becoming more stringent during this period, the reduction in bank capital levels
became a binding constraint on lending activities for Japanese banks.
Japanese banks typically hold signicant equity positions and therefore re-
ductions in stock prices erode bank capital levels, thereby constraining the sup-
ply of bank loans. However, Kim and Moreno (1994) also note that falling equity
8 International banks were permitted to include up to 70% of unrealized gains on equity
security holdings (hidden reserves) into their capital in order to meet the new capital require-
ments instituted in May 1986 in Japan. After the adoption of Basel I, this was decreased to
allow only 45% of hidden reserves to be included into Tier 2 bank capital; see Honda (2002).
Honda (2002) examines Japanese bank credit creation during the period of 1967-1994 and
nds that the introduction of Basel I reduced aggregate bank credit signicantly.
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prices in Japan may reect deteriorating economic conditions that would reduce
the demand for bank loans. Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) nd that the deregula-
tion leading up to the Big Bang has played a major role in the current banking
problems. This deregulation allowed large corporations to quickly switch from
depending on banks to relying on capital market nancing. The deregulation
was much less favorable for savers and consequently they mostly continued de-
positing their savings in banks. However, banks were also constrained. They
were not given authorization to move out of traditional activities into new lines
of business. These developments together meant that the banks retained assets
and had to search for new investment activities. Their new lending primarily
owed to small businesses and became much more tied to property than in the
past. These loans have not fared well during the 1990s. Kazuo Ueda (1998)
agrees with Hoshi and Kashyap and nds nancial liberalization had resulted in
increased lending to small rms and real estate sector during the latter part of
eighties, which turned to "non performing loans" in the 1990s when the real es-
tate prices collapsed. Ricardo Caballero, Takeo Hoshi and Anil Kashyap (2004)
argue that most large Japanese banks were only able to comply with capital
standards because regulators were lax in their inspections. To facilitate this for-
bearance, the banks often engaged in sham loan restructuring that kept credit
owing to otherwise insolvent borrowers (that they call zombies). Thus, the
normal competitive outcome whereby the zombies would shed workers and lose
market share was thwarted. Robert Dekle and Kenneth Kletzer (2003) also
highlight the importance of government policies. They analyze the impact of
government policies regarding bank lending on the economy and show how gov-
ernment deposit guarantees and regulatory forbearance can lead to permanent
declines in the growth rate of the economy. The Land Revaluation law, which
is the subject of this paper, can also be viewed as a form of regulatory forbear-
ance. Akiyoshi Horiuchi and Katsutoshi Shimizu (1998) perform an empirical
study to analyze whether the slowdown of credit supply by banks was a result
of deterioration of equity capital. They nd that "after a substantial decline
in their capital base, the major Japanese banks issued subordinated debt to
recover their capital".
In this paper, we examine the impact of supply shocks driven by capital
requirements on lending activity.
Closest to our paper is the seminal work of Peek and Rosengren (1997) who
examine the impact of supply shocks on aggregate lending behavior in Japan.
They argue that the dramatic 70% decline in Japanese commercial real estate
prices from their peak in 1990 provides a natural experiment to test the extent
to which a loan supply shock can a¤ect real economic activity. Their view is that
these shocks were external to U.S. credit markets, yet connected through the
substantial penetration of U.S. lending markets by Japanese banks, which allows
them to identify an exogenous loan supply shock. They use this exogenous shock
to account for lending uctuations and ultimately uctuations in construction
activity in major commercial real estate markets in the United States. In a
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related paper, Heather Montgomery (2005) examines the allocative e¤ect on
Japanese bank lending in the aftermath of Basel I. Using a time series and panel
data of internationally active and domestically active Japanese banks during the
period 1982 to 1999, she investigates if implementation of Basel I encouraged
banks to move away from heavily weighted assets like corporate bonds and loans
to unweighted assets like government bonds. She concludes that total regulatory
capital requirements did not cause changes in bank portfolios. However, she
nds that internationally active banksasset portfolios are sensitive to Tier 1
capital requirements.
A possible shortcoming of these conicting empirical studies is that the credit
crunch literature su¤ers from an identication problem in that there are several
possible supply and demand e¤ects that may explain the apparent decline in
lending that coincided with the introduction of Basel I9 . Bizer (1993) nds
that banking supervisors assigned lower CAMEL ratings to banks during the
credit crunch period. Moreover, Peek and Rosengren (1995a, 1995b) nd that
regulatory actions, such as cease and desist orders, had a signicant impact
on bank lending activity, and a secular shift in banking away from on-balance
sheet to more lucrative o¤-balance sheet activities. After controlling for these
factors, Furne (2001) nds that "some form of regulatory involvement, either
raising capital requirements or increasing regulatory monitoring, was a necessary
contributor to the credit crunch. That is, the observed portfolio adjustment
undertaken in the early 1990s could not have been simply the result of changing
economic conditions or secular change"(Furne (2001), pp. 36.)
In this paper, we use a natural experiment (the passage of the Land Reval-
uation law) to disentangle demand and supply e¤ects.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on bank regulations and
geographic segmentation. For example, Krozsner and Strahan (1999) examine
the 1994 deregulation of intrastate and interstate branch banking and nd that
geographic segmentation is substantially reduced when the regulatory barriers
to entry are removed. In contrast, Becker (2005) nds substantial geographic
segmentation even when there are no regulatory barriers. He examines bank
access to local deposit supply. Using the fraction of seniors in a community
as an instrument, he nds that the local availability of bank deposits has a
9Hancock, et al. (1995) attempt to disentangle the loan supply e¤ect (due to shifts in
regulatory capital requirements) from the loan demand e¤ect (due to an economic contraction
that reduced loan demand) using a vector-autoregression model and nd that banks adjust
their capital positions much more quickly than they adjust their loan positions. Moreover,
credit-constrained banks reduced their lending by greater amounts than well-capitalized banks,
suggesting that some, but not all, of the explanation for the credit crunch can be traced to
regulatory restrictions.
Furne (2001) incorporates the following four explanations into a theoretical model that is
confronted with actual US bank data in order to simulate bank reactions to changes in capital
requirements. Aggregate lending in the US decreased in the early 1990s as a result of: (1)
higher capital requirements mandated by Basel I, (2) lower loan demand due to the economic
recession, (3) greater regulatory scrutiny.
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signicant impact on loan supply. In the context of this paper, we test the
geographic integration of bank lending policy across regulatory policy venues in
the U.S. and Japan.
3 Data and Methodology
On March 17, 1998, the "Financial Crisis Administration Committee" in the
Japanese governments Deposit Insurance Corporation announced the plan for
restructuring 21 major Japanese banks using public funds. The purpose of in-
jecting these funds was to correct the "kashishiburi" or the reluctance of the
Japanese banks to lend to Japanese companies. One of the major reasons for
"kashishiburi" was believed to be the strict implementation of the Basel I cap-
ital adequacy ratio. In order to further boost the capital requirements the Diet
passed a bill on March 31st 1998 (law No. 34/1998) which essentially allowed
banks to increase their capital requirement by revising the value of their land
holdings from the original acquisition costs to the current market value. Sum-
marizing the main clauses of the law:
1. Land: Land includes not for sale real property situated in Japan but not
buildings and structures built on it, held in use by Japanese banks and
industries.
2. Method of Revaluation: Land holdings are permitted to be revalued
at the current market value based on one of the ve following methods:
(1) Value of land announced by law concerning public announcement of
land value (Law No. 49/1969), (2) the value of land used by government
to enforce National Land Use Planning Act (3) the value of land as shown
on tax rolls (4) value of land as declared by Commissioner of National
Tax Administration for Land value taxation (5) value of land as certied
by a real estate appraiser. Banks hold the option to revalue their land
holdings.
3. Applicable Judicial Entities: The law applies to all banks and all
other companies and nancial institutions with a certain capital position
(for example capital stock greater than 500 million yen)
4. Opportunity for Revaluation: The revaluation can be done only once
on a settlement of accounts day within two years from the date of com-
mencement or enforcement of the law (31st March, 1998). Thereafter the
revalued land will be xed on the banksor companysbook at the reval-
ued basis. Thus, banks with positive land revaluation reserves obtained a
permanent regulatory capital infusion.
5. Appropriation of the revaluation to the balance sheet: After the
di¤erence between the revalued gure and the original entry to the value
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of land is calculated, the gure shall be appropriated to the assets side of
the balance sheet and to the liabilities side as a reserve for revaluation.
No taxation occurs until the land is actually sold and capital gains are
realized.
The Land Revaluation Law provided a way for Japanese banks to meet the
capital adequacy ratio. The revaluation law was based on the assumptions that
(1) Japanese banks had a considerable holding of land assets (2) the acquisition
costs of land were much lower than the land price in March 1998, even after the
huge decline in land prices. The key benet of the Land Revaluation Law lies on
two factors (1) this is a onetime event and since the acquisition cost is much lower
than the current land prices, most banks would be able to show substantial gains
in land value, (2) the subsequent gains or losses though disclosed in nancial
statements, would not be booked and would not a¤ect equity capital. Figure 1
shows that while land prices increased at roughly the same pace as equity prices
during the bubble period, the rate of decline in the mid to late 1990s was much
slower for land than equity prices.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
Table 1 shows that all of the top ten Japanese banks with the exception
of Shizuoka bank took advantage of the Land Revaluation Law. Most banks
revalued their land as soon as the law was enacted and all banks reported gains
on revaluation. The gains range from 5 million Japanese Yen in case of Mitsui
Trust Holdings, Inc. to 534 million Japanese Yen for Mizuho Holdings. Moreover
all banks report subsequent losses in the period following revaluation. The value
of these losses as a percentage of net assets range from 6.2% for Daiwa Bank
Holdings to 8.4% for Chiba Bank. The fact that these losses were not reported
and did not have to be accounted for in capital adequacy calculations provide
further insight into the importance of Land Revaluation Law in propping up
capital requirements.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
For our analysis we utilize two databases. One contains data on Japanese
bank lending in Japan, whereas the other examines Japanese bank lending in
the US. With regard to the Japanese domestic loan database, we take panel
data that includes aggregate quarterly observations from rst quarter of 1983
until last quarter of 2003 of the three major types of Japanese banks that had
commercial lending operations: City banks, Regional 1 banks and Regional 2
banks10 . This covers almost 70% of loan demand catered by private nancial
10Note that Regional 1 and Regional 2 banks are distinct in their origin. Originally, member
banks that now comprise Regional2 banks were established as joint stock companies under
the Sogo Bank Law of 1951 and were referred to as "Sogo Banks". Over the years, however,
the types of business conducted by Sogo banks and ordinary commercial banks have become
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institutions in Japan. The other nancial institutions that are depository insti-
tutions include the trust banks and the long term credit banks, which cater to
7% of loan demand (as reported by Japanese Bankers Association). We do not
include trust banks and long term credit banks in our analysis as the balance
sheet data on these banks are available only through 2000. We use aggregate
data over individual banks in order to control for bank mergers11 . After adjust-
ing for lags in capital asset ratio, our sample contains 248 quarterly datapoints.
The database is available from Bank of Japan that provides us quarterly balance
sheet of commercial banks in Japan aggregated by bank types.
The second database provides data on Japanese bank lending in the US.
The data is obtained from quarterly US call report data over the period 1980
to 2003. In addition to City and Regional banks we also include data for other
types of Japanese banks, including trust and long-term credit banks operating
in US as Peek and Rosengren (1997) suggests that trust and long-term credit
banks had the second most prominent presence in the US loan market after
Japanese City banks. Adjusting for lags, we have 283 quarterly datapoints.
Our basic model specication is of the form:
4Li;j(t)
Ai(t)
= P0X(t) + P1Y (t) + P2Z(t) + P3K(t) (1)
where:
4Li;j(t)
Ai;j(t)
: change in outstanding loans of bank of type i to sector j between
the period t and t  1 as a ratio of total assets of bank i:
similar, and because of this development, the Sogo banks began in quick succession to convert
to regional banks which were classied as ordinary commercial banks from 1989 onward.
Traditionally, there were 64 banks which were referred to as "regional banks" in Japan, but
due to the conversion of Sogo banks , this number has now doubled. Although the new
regional banks carry out exactly the same operations as the original regional banks, their
origins di¤er considerably. As a result, new regional banks have set up their own Second
Association of Regional Banks independently of the Regional Banks Association of Japan
(source: http://www.dainichiginkyo.or.jp/english.html)
11One of the most important mergers was between Fuji Bank, the Industrial Bank of Japan
and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank in September 2000, to form a mega bank group called Mizuho
Financial Group.
This was followed by three other big mergers involving in April 2001. Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi Trust and Nippon Trust merged to form the Mitsubishi-Tokyo Finan-
cial Group.
The second merger was between Sakura Bank and Sumitomo Bank which established the
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC).
The third merger involved Sanwa Bank, Tokai Bank and Toyo Trust to set up the United
Financial of Japan (UFJ) group.
The most recent consolidation was in December 2001 when Daiwa Bank, Kinki Osaka Bank
and Nara Bank merged.
In March 2002, Asahi Bank joined them to form another nancial group that was tentatively
named Resona Holdings in October 2002 and Resona Bank joined them in May 2003 (see
Adrian van Rixtel, Ioana Alexopoulou and Kimie Harada (2003) for more details).
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We consider four categories of loans, i:
(1) total loans
(2) loans to the non-residential real estate sector
(3) loans to the housing sector12 and
(4) commercial and industrial loans
In addition to the change in lending behavior, we also look at changes in
assets and change in protability of the Japanese banks during the period under
consideration.
Our explanatory variables are summarized in the matrices: X(t); Y (t); Z(t)
and K(t)
X(t) is a matrix of variables that describe the general characteristics of the
bank category and includes the seasonal dummies where:
X(t) =
26666664
Q1(t)
Q2(t)
Q3(t)
city(t)
regi(t)
asset(t)
37777775
Qi(t); i 2 f1; 2; 3g: denotes the dummy for the quarter under consideration
and takes the value 1 or 0; the fourth quarter is omitted.
city(t) : denotes the dummy for "City banks" and takes a value 1 if the bank
under consideration is a City bank and 0 if it is not.
regi(t) : denotes the dummy for "Regional banks" and takes a value 1 if the
bank under consideration is a Regional bank and 0 if it is not. i 2 f1; 2g denotes
the type of Regional bank under consideration, whether a Regional 1 bank or a
Regional 2 bank.
asset(t) : denotes the log of assets of the bank. This factor reects the size
of the bank.
Loans can change due to both demand as well as supply conditions. Since we
are interested in exogenous supply side shocks from regulatory policy changes,
we control for demand e¤ects in the matrix Y (t):
12Looking at the reporting requirements mandated by FDIC on branches of foreign banks
operating in United States, we nd that though banks are required to report aggregate real
estate lending as well as lending to the non-residential real estate sector (primarily construction
and land development), however banks are not required to distinguish between housing loans
and loans furnished against home equity. As a result we cannot distinguish between loans
made for housing from home equity line of credit that also includes second mortgages and
other credit lines borrowed against ones home. This is not the case for domestic lending by
Japanese banks where we can get data on housing loans, as distinguished from home equity
line of credit. Hence for Japanese bank lending in the US, we report results for aggregate real
estate lending only and do not separately look at housing vis-a-vis non-residential real estate
loans.
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Y (t) : is a matrix of variables that describe the demand conditions of the
economy.
Y (t) =
2664
gdp(t)
OtherLoan(t)
confidence(t)
loanloss(t)
3775
The demand variables are summarized as:
gdp(t) : rate of change of Gross Domestic Product between periods t and t 1.
We expect lending to be a positive function of GDP. The data on GDP for Japan
is available from the Japan Statistical Yearbook and that of US is available
from National Income and Product Accounts of United States published by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
OtherLoan(t): rate of change in lending between periods t and t   1 of
non Japanese banks as a share of the previous period assets. Non Japanese
banks are not subject to policy regulations by the Japanese government but
would respond to uctuations in local demand so we use it as a proxy for local
demand conditions. The data on foreign lending in Japan is collected from the
Bank of Japan and the data of non-Japanese lending in United States is available
from the call reports led with Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
confidence(t) : an index that tells us how consumers view the future eco-
nomic conditions. Consumer Condence Index for Japan is collected from the
ESRI-HISTAT-JIP database of Economic and Social Research Institute of Japan
and those for United States are available from University of Michigan13 .
loanloss(t) : provisions made by banks for general loan loss reserves as one
of the independent variables. In Japan, as pointed out by Kashyap and Hoshi
13We have also conducted a robustness check incorporating other indicators of demand with
no substantial changes in our results. These other variables are:
pop(t) : rate of change in population between periods t and t   1. We expect lending to
increase if population increases
fdi(t): rate of change in foreign direct investment between periods t and t   1. This is a
pure demand side factor as foreign direct investment to a country increases in response to
increased demand by the rms of a country and we expect this term to capture the economic
environment in the country.
cpi(t) : consumer price index during period t: The CPI a¤ects the purchasing power of the
consumers and thus can a¤ect the demand for bank loans in two ways: it can directly a¤ect
the demand for housing loans by households and indirectly, a change in CPI can change a
households demand for goods and services and thus a¤ect rm behavior which in turn will
a¤ect demand for bank loans by industries.
industry_index(t) : we consider the future outlook for the four sectors under consideration;
totindex summarizes the overall business outlook for future
nonmanindex: summarizes the business outlook for the non-manufacturing sector, real
estate being one of them;
manindex : summarizes the business outlook for the manufacturing sector.
jip(t) :the index of industrial production prepared by the Bank of Japan that indicates how
productive the economy is
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(2004) and Peek and Rosengren (2003) amongst others, Japanese banks have
very close lending relationships with the borrowers and so in many cases during
the nineties recession preferred to "evergreen" the loans rather than conscate
the collateral in case of non-repayment thus potentially keeping "zombie" rms
alive. They often kept substantial reserves for these loan losses which potentially
can have serious consequences on their lending behavior. Such loan loss reserves
can also be considered as an additional proxy for domestic economic conditions
in Japan. The data on loan loss reserves is available from nancial statements
of Japanese banks that are led with the Bank of Japan. Note that in Japan up
to 1.25% of general loan loss provisions can also be included in Tier 2 capital.
The supply side factors in our analysis focus on exogenous regulatory policy
changes. Z(t) is a matrix that includes the dummies for the three periods
under consideration: liberalization, post Basel I and post Land Revaluation
Law. For our analysis, a particular period begins when all policies that dene
that particular period have been fully implemented (and not when the policies
were rst put in place). In our model, the period leading up to liberalization of
nancial markets in Japan began in the late 1970s and continued until the big
bang in 1986.
Z(t) =
24 lib(t)basel1(t)
basel99(t)
35
lib(t) : denotes the liberalization period which in our model is taken from
1986:1 to 1992:4.
basel1(t) : denotes the period when Basel I was fully in force, but prior
to the enactment of the Land Revaluation Law. Insofar as Basel I was fully
implemented by March 1993, we take the post liberalization or Basel I period
as 1993:1 to 1998:4
basel99(t) : denotes the period when Land Revaluation Law was in force.
Although a two year period was granted to the banks to adopt land revaluation,
most banks that took advantage of the law completed land revaluation within
a year of its enactment. Hence we take the post Land Revaluation Law period
to be from 1999:1 to 2003:4.
Finally we examine the components of capital that are used to meet the
capital adequacy requirements. K(t) is a matrix that includes the variables
related to capital adequacy requirements:
K(t) =

tier1i(t)
tier2i(t)

Tier1i(t) : denotes the Tier 1 capital output ratio for a bank type i in
period t. Tier 1 capital is common to all countries and primarily consists of
common stock-holders equity and disclosed reserves. Due to a lack of data on
risk weighted assets, particularly in the eighties and early nineties we follow
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Montgomery (2005) and Watanabe (2004) and calculate capital output ratio
as the ratio of book value of capital to "unrisk-wighted" assets as opposed to
"risk-weighted assets" used by the BIS measure.
Tier2i(t) : includes the components of Tier 2 capital as a share of assets for
a bank type i in period t. The elements of Tier 2 capital consists of capital-like
securities. In case of Japan, they primarily consist of the market values of secu-
rities not already included in the balance sheet. In this regard, the two major
securities considered are equities and land. Japanese banks are distinct from
others in that they hold signicant portion of their borrowers equity securities
and in addition they have substantial land holdings. The Land Revaluation
Law of 1998 allowed the revalued land assets to be calculated as part of Tier 2
capital in addition to equity revaluation.
In addition to the model estimated above, we estimate two other models:
4Assets
Assets
= P0X(t) + P1Y (t) + P2Y (t) + P3Z(t) + P4K(t) (2)
4Pr ofits
Pr ofits
= P0X(t) + P1Y (t) + P2Y (t) + P3Z(t) + P4K(t) (3)
We estimate equations (1), (2) and (3) using OLS, controlled for xed e¤ects
due to bank types.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive statistics on Japanese bank lending in Japan
Table 2 shows the evolution of domestic lending in Japan over the di¤erent
sub-periods by lending category. We provide the data on aggregate lending and
lending by di¤erent types (City, Regional 1 and Regional 2) in panels 2-a to
2-d respectively. In the rst row of each table, we provide the average value
of loans in 100 million yen and in the second row we provide the loans to each
industry as a percentage of total loans. Our primary interest is in evolution
of bank lending during our subperiods. We provide the change in loans as a
fraction of beginning of the period assets (in percentages) in row three that
is a good measure of changes in lending behavior and has been used by Peek
and Rosengren (2000) amongst others. We also provide the associated standard
deviation in row four.
In addition, in Table 3 we list the growth rate of assets and prots during
di¤erent subperiods and by bank categories. Also, our focus of interest is the
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revaluation of land and equity in Japan for which data becomes available be-
ginning in 1999. In Table 3 we have included the associated average values of
equity revaluation and land revaluation by bank types.
As we see from Table 2 in its various panels, housing, C&I and non-
residential real estate lending comprises about 40% of total loans in Japan (the
gure dropped to 38% during the post Basel I period but in the post Land
Revaluation Law period, it again increased to about 43%). The liberalization
period witnessed loan expansion for all bank types, the major winners being
the non-residential real estate sector and the housing sector as widely believed
in literature. However, commercial and industrial lending decreased. Growth
rate of housing loans increased from .05% to .17%, and the growth rate of non-
residential real estate loans went up from .19% to .2%. During this period, C&I
loans fell from .34% to -.04%. It is plausible that liberalization increased access
of bigger primarily manufacturing rms (those who demand commercial and
industrial (C&I) loans) to international nancial market. Given this environ-
ment, the banks turned to providing more real estate backed loans which owed
to commercial real estate sector as well as housing.
The post Basel I period when banks had implemented the regulations man-
dated by Basel I rst hit commercial and industrial loans that had already
started to shrink in the post liberalization phase. However the loans to the
real estate sector, both commercial real estate as well as housing shows positive
growth (though the growth rate considerably slows for commercial real estate).
This trend is consistent with arbitrage opportunities presented by Basel I accord
as housing loans carry a lower risk weight so housing remained a lucrative lend-
ing opportunity. As for non-residential real estate, banks shared a close lending
relationship with domestic borrowers (comprised mainly of real estate borrowers
as big manufacturing rms had moved away from debt to equity nancing dur-
ing the liberalization period) which prevented banks from drastically reducing
loans even when Basel accord put a squeeze on capital positions. The trend of
increased loans to housing continued in the post Land Revaluation Law period
though for the rst time, non-residential real estate loans as a percentage of
assets register a fall and the growth rate of non-residential loans turns negative.
However the rate of decline of C&I loans, specially for City banks which mostly
cater to C&I loan demand, reduces (from -.07 in the post Basel I period to -.066
in the post Land Revaluation Law period) which might be a result of a positive
shock to capital due to the Land Revaluation Law.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
In Table 3, we look at the growth rates of assets and prots. Growth rate of
assets and prots increased during the liberalization period. In the post Basel
I period, though the growth rate of assets declined, it was still positive (except
for Regional1 banks). However, the growth rate of prots turned negative. In
an interesting turn of events, in the post land revaluation period, the growth
rate of assets picked up (except for second tier Regional banks). At the same
time, the rate of decline in prots reduces ( for example, if we look at all banks,
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then the rate of decline was -2.1% in post Basel I period, it declined to -1.6%
in the post Land Revaluation Law period).
Given this data, we conclude that it was in late nineties that the e¤ect of
Basel I was really being observed in the Japanese banks. The hitherto untouched
non-residential real estate sector faced a decline in loans though housing loans
did not register signicant changes. At the same time, in the post land revalu-
ation period, assets, protability and C&I loans (of City banks in particular)
show some improvement.
The Land Revaluation Law was enacted to relax the requirements of Basel I
by allowing banks to count up to 45% of their unrealized gains on land holding
towards Tier 2 capital. We had earlier seen in Table 1 that amongst the major
banks that had actually taken advantage of the Land Revaluation Law, all banks
reported net unrealized gains. In Table 3, we look at the aggregate gures by
bank types. As Table 3 shows us, revalued land accounts for .3% of assets of
the banks, and all types of banks show positive land revaluation gures which
we suspect, might have a signicant e¤ect on bank lending behavior. Equity
revaluation for its part does not necessarily show a gain. For example, for
City banks equity revaluation actually shows a loss, and it is only signicant
(accounting for .48% of assets) only for Regional banks.
We suspect that the Land Revaluation Law played a signicant role in in-
uencing bank lending post 1999 which can account for some of the observed
trends.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
4.2 Results of Japanese bank domestic lending
In our regression analysis we statistically examine the impact of bank capital
regulatory policy shocks on Japanese bank lending behavior. Table 4 sum-
marizes the regression results of our estimates of equation (1). There is no
signicant aggregate e¤ect on bank lending in Japan as a result of either the
adoption of Basel I in 1993 or the implementation of the Land Revaluation Law
in 1999. That is, both the dummy variables (Basel1; Basel99) and the interac-
tive terms (Tier1  Basel1; T ier1  Basel99 etc) have insignicant coe¢ cients
for all dependent variables. However, comparison of the regression results for
C&I loans (column (4)) and housing loans (column (3)) illustrate the alloca-
tive e¤ects of the passage of the Land Revaluation Law. The coe¢ cient on the
Landreval Basel99 independent variable is signicantly (at the 5%) negative
(a coe¢ cient of 1.72) for residential mortgage lending, whereas it is signi-
cantly (at the 1% level) positive (a coe¢ cient of 2.06) for commercial lending.
This suggests a substitution e¤ect for banks with large positive land revaluation
reserves. The capital infusion permits the Japanese banks to reduce the share
of real estate lending in their portfolio and increase their holdings of higher
yielding, unsecured commercial loans.
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Other results are not surprising. The coe¢ cient on ASSET in Table 4 is
negative and statistically signicant at the 1% level, suggesting that Japanese
bank lending declined overall during the period of the banking and nancial cri-
sis during the 1990s. Japanese nancial market liberalization is reected in the
positive and signicant (at the 5% level) coe¢ cients on foreign loans, consistent
with the opening up of Japanese nancial markets internationally during the
post 1986 period of nancial market liberalization in Japan. The negative and
signicant coe¢ cient on the Liberalization variable ( 0.003) in Column (4) of
Table 4 shows that this liberalization resulted in large commercial rmsshift
from Japanese bank loans to international capital markets to meet their nanc-
ing needs. At the same time, the positive and signicant (at 1%) coe¢ cients
associated with real estate lending (.002 for non-residential real estate and .001
for housing) indicates a shift of bank loans to real estate sector as highlighted in
literature. The lack of signicance on the LoanLoss variables (except for housing
loans) for all subperiods reects the inability of distressed banks to capitalize
on the forbearance in Japanese bank capital regulations. During the post Basel
I period, we nd banks with increased loan loss reserves lent more to housing.
The coe¢ cient is signicant and positive (.7 and .51 in post Basel I and Basel 99
periods). This result is very intuitive as it shows that banks that had increased
loan loss reserves indicating large amounts of non-performing loans, shifted to
lending for housing which carries a lower risk weight (50%) according to Basel
stipulations.
[INSERT TABLE 4]
Table 5 shows the competitive advantage of the Japanese banks with larger
land revaluation reserves. The change in protability for banks with positive
land revaluation after the passage of the Law is statistically signicantly (at the
1% level) positive14 as is the coe¢ cient on equity revaluation. This suggests
that the regulatory forbearance incorporated in both land revaluations and eq-
uity revaluations signicantly improved Japanese bank protability in a time of
declining prots. Thus our results are consistent with bank lending behavior in
Japan that was sensitive not only to the numerator (capital measurements) of
the Basel Capital but also the denominator that has to do with risk weighting
of assets and provides banks with a clear regulatory arbitrage opportunity. We
nd Japanese banks taking advantage of this opportunity.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
14The coe¢ cient associated with land revaluation is extremely high. We suspect this has
to do with the volatility of protability gures. The time series on protability shows wild
uctuations in the latter part of the nineties, with protability change registering double digit
increases in certain quarters followed by negative growth in the next.
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4.3 Descriptive statistics on Japanese bank lending in the
US
Apart from its domestic lending operations, Japanese banks also have a signif-
icant international presence. As Peek and Rosengren (1997) shows, by 1990s
almost all of the top 10 banks in the world were headquartered in Japan. Peek
and Rosengren (1997) studies the impact of Basel I on US lending operations
of the Japanese banks during the period 1988 to 1994. Given that the Land
Revaluation Law was a positive boost to the capital positions of Japanese banks,
we also want to investigate if it a¤ected US lending.
We present the descriptive statistics of lending by Japanese bank branches
in US in Table 6 (there are four panels, 6-a lists aggregate lending behavior,
6-b to 6-d outline the lending behavior by bank types). We concentrate on loans
to the real estate sector and the C&I loans as they constitute about 70% of total
lending in US (except for the pre-liberalization period, when the share was less).
As Table 6 shows us, over the post-liberalization period (1986:1 to 1992:1)
overseas loans registered a sharp increase in all sectors, including loans backed
by real estate and C&I loans. This was a result of increase in foreign invest-
ment opportunities but more so a result of gradual relaxation of the regulatory
policies.
The experiences of di¤erent types of banks during the post Basel I period
are varied. The rate of loan growth turns negative for City, Regional 1and
Regional 2 banks, though clearly, the City banks were not as badly hit as the
Regional banks. In fact when we look at the aggregate lending, we nd that
though growth rate declines for all types of loans, the decline is larger for loans
backed by real estate. This is a result of the fact that Regional banks played
an important role in lending to real estate sector. However by 2000, most of
the Regional banks had shrunk their US operations while most City banks and
others (trust and long term Regional banks) continued to operate.
A comparison with domestic lending shows that real estate lending at the
same period in Japan was increasing though even domestic C&I loans did
decline. This is an allocative change, which might have been prompted by close
domestic relationships, but also by the fact that banks that only had domestic
operations faced a more lenient 4% MOF ratio.
Post 1999, though the lending by City banks and Regional 1 banks (partic-
ularly to C&I sector) improved (the growth rate of C& I loans for City banks
went from -.08% in post Basel I to 1.41% in post Land Revaluation Law pe-
riod, the corresponding numbers for the Regional 1 banks are -2.2 to 2.39%),
the aggregate lending did not show such improvement which may be a result of
shrinkage of US operations by many Japanese banks (in particular second tier
Regional banks most of which had ceased all US operations by 1996).
[INSERT TABLE 6]
In comparison, lending by non-Japanese banks in United States show unilat-
eral increase in all sectors as outlined in Table 7. This further establishes that
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changes in lending by Japanese banks were due to regulatory or policy changes
a¤ecting Japanese banks and not so much due to changes in demand for loans15 .
[INSERT TABLE 7]
4.4 Results of Japanese bank lending in the US
Examining the reaction of Japanese bank lending behavior in the U.S., Table
8 shows that there is an aggregate level e¤ect of the Land Revaluation Law.
The coe¢ cients on TierOne  Basel99 and TierTwo  Basel99 are both nega-
tive and statistically signicant at the 5% level, suggesting that well-capitalized
Japanese banks reduced their total lending in the U.S. in the wake of the pas-
sage of the Land Revaluation Law. This result seems to be driven by real estate
lending in US by Japanese banks as the coe¢ cient on TierOne  Basel99 and
TierTwo  Basel99 associated with real estate lending is negative (-.31 and -
.32) respectively. We do not see such a shrinkage associated with C&I loans.
Together with the earlier regression results (see Table 4), this suggests that the
Law induced a substitution away from real estate lending in both the U.S. and
Japan in the wake of Land Revaluation Law toward more protable commer-
cial lending. The negative, although insignicant coe¢ cient on U.S. domestic
bank lending (OtherLoan) suggests that this e¤ect is not the result of local U.S.
demand conditions.
[INSERT TABLE 8]
To further test the robustness of our result that indeed the international
lending behavior of Japanese banks were an artifact of changes in regulatory
policy applicable to Japanese banks and not local demand conditions, we follow
Peek and Rosengren (1997) and regress the deviations in Japanese lending in
United States from their non-Japanese counterparts and call this specication
two to distinguish this test from the previous regression which we call speci-
cation one. We report the result in Table 9. Our results are exactly similar
to those outlined in Table 8, with the coe¢ cients on TierOne  Basel99 and
TierTwo Basel99 being negative and signicant at 5% further supporting our
ndings that supply shocks induced by regulatory forbearance policies induced
changes in Japanese bank lending behavior.
[INSERT TABLE 9]
15Had the shrinkage of loans by Japanese bank branches been a result of shifts in demand,
then we would also have seen such shrinkages in lending by non-Japanese banks operating in
US.
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5 Conclusion
This paper is the rst to examine the allocative and aggregate lending e¤ects of
a signicant divergence in Japanese bank capital regulations from the interna-
tional Basel standards stemming from the 1998 passage of the Land Revaluation
Law in Japan. We investigate the impact of lending in the U.S. and Japan of the
Land Revaluation Law passed in 1998 that permitted banks to count 45% of the
unrealized gains on their real estate holdings as Tier 2 capital. We nd evidence
that this induced considerable shifts in bank lending behavior. In particular,
well-capitalized Japanese banks were able to utilize this regulatory capital in-
fusion in order to shift their lending from low margin mortgages toward higher
yielding commercial loans. Moreover, we nd that these banks shifted some of
their lending out of U.S. lending, predominately secured by real estate, toward
domestic Japanese lending to fund manufacturing. However, there does not
appear to be an overall aggregate e¤ect of this regulatory policy shock. Thus,
we nd that the impact of this regulatory policy divergence from international
norms tends to redistribute lending across di¤erent sectors of the economy with-
out impacting the overall amount of lending signicantly.
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Table 1: Financial Statement of a sample of Japanese banks in the
wake of Land Revaluation Law
Bank Total Net prots Capital Revaluation Gain Future
assets (losses) adequacy date (loss) Gain (loss)
Millions of Japanese Yen
(1)Mizuho Holdings 151, 312 (976) 10.56% 03/31/98 534 (228)
(2)Sumitotmo Mitsui 108, 005 (464) 10.45% 03/31/98 121 (92)
Banking Corp.
(3) Mitsubishi Tokyo 99, 497 (152) 10.3% 03/31/98 202 (118)
Financial Group
(4) UFJ Holdings 79, 773 (1,227) 11.04% 03/31/98 131 (70)
(5) Daiwa Bank 44, 952 (932) 8.76% 113 (80)
Holdings Inc.
(6) Sumitomo Trust 16, 704 (42) 10.86% 03/31/98 6 (7)
& Banking Company
(7) Mitsui Trust 13, 373 (278) 10.59% 03/31/98 5 (6)
Holding Inc.
(8) Bank of 10, 765 20 10.72% 03/31/98 33 (27)
Yokohama
(9) Shizuoka Bank 8, 178 7 12.51% No revaluation - -
(10) Chiba Bank 8, 146 335 10.22% 03/31/98 13 (28)
Note: The data is in millions of Japanese Yen. The gain in land value is measured
as the di¤erence in value resulting from di¤erences in urban land prices in 1998-1999
and the historical acquisition cost of land. Note that future gains or losses is calculated
as the estimated annual di¤erence in land values.
Data source: KPMG Japan(2002)
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on domestic lending by Japanese
banks by sectors
Table 2-a: Descriptive statistics: aggregate over all banks
Aggregate over all banks
Housing
loans C&I loans
Non-residential
Real estate loans Total loans
Pre – liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 166816.15 642891.41 129395.96 2239114.1
Share of total loans 7.45% 28.71% 5.77%
Changes in outstanding loans as a
share of assets .05% .34% .19% 1.75%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.04%) (.43%) (.1% ) (1.42%)
Liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 308185.86 662436.02 322670.38 3384213.8
Share of total loans 9.11% 19.57% 9.54%
Changes in outstanding loans
 as a share of assets .17% -.04% .2% 1.08%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.1% ) (.29%) (.16%) (1.12%)
Post Basel One period
Outstanding loans- Levels 482553.33 609818.63 453296.92 4026227
Share of total loans 11.98% 15.15% 11.25%
Changes in outstanding loans as a
share of assets .13% -.04% .05% .09%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.11%) (.33%) (.06%) (1.02%)
Post Land Revaluation Law period
Outstanding loans- Levels 684925.63 551949.63 464338.05 3874858.6
Share of total loans 17.66% 14.24% 11.98%
Changes in outstanding loans as a
share of assets .16% -.09% -.05% -.37%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.1% ) (.26%) (.1% ) (.93%)
Note: We subdivide the sample period of 1983:1 to 2003:4 into 4 sub-periods: pre-
liberalization period (1983:1 to 1985:4), Post liberalization period (1986:1 to 1992:4),
Post Basel I period (1993:1 to 1998:4), and Post Land Revaluation Law period (1991:1
to 2003:4). For each sub-periods, the rst row shows the amount of domestic loans
outstanding by sector of Japanese banks measured in 100 million yen. The second
row shows the sectoral lending as a percentage of total lending. The third row shows
the change in outstanding loans as a share of beginning of the period asset. This is
our measure for evolution of bank lending over time. The standard deviation of the
change in loans as a share of beginning of the period assets are in parenthesis.
In Panel 2-a we provide the data aggregated over all banks by sectors and periods.
Data source: Assets and liabilities report of banks from Bank of Japan and the
time series on lending by sectors also from Bank of Japan.
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Table 2-b: Descriptive statistics: lending by City banks
City Banks
Housing
loans C&I loans
Non-residential
Real estate loans Total loans
Pre – liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 74032.62 390535.08 67238.413 1211443.1
Share of total loans 6.1% 32.15% 5.53%
Changes in outstanding loans as a
share of assets .06% .38% .21% 2%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.053%) (.4% ) (.1% ) (.96%)
Liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 183667.89 388667.45 194524.92 1916165
Share of total loans 9.56% 20.27% 10.09%
Changes in outstanding loans as a
share of assets .2% -.09% .22% 1.07%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.1% ) (.27%) (.21%) (.95%)
Post Basel One period
Outstanding loans- Levels 282126.63 314408 270782.96 2180057.6
Share of total loans 12.94% 14.36% 12.44%
Changes in outstanding loans as a
share of assets .09% -.07% .04% -.06%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.1% ) (.37%) (.08%) (.1% )
Post Land Revaluation Law period
Outstanding loans- Levels 364900.26 295693.74 282369.84 2072184.4
Share of total loans 17.58% 14.32% 13.59%
Changes in outstanding loans as a
share of assets .1% -.066% -.05% -.35%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.09%) (.33%) (.18%) (1.3%)
Note: We subdivide the sample period of 1983:1 to 2003:4 into 4 sub-periods: pre-
liberalization period (1983:1 to 1985:4), Post liberalization period (1986:1 to 1992:4),
Post Basel I period (1993:1 to 1998:4), and Post Land Revaluation Law period (1991:1
to 2003:4). For each sub-periods, the rst row shows the amount of domestic loans
outstanding by sector of Japanese banks measured in 100 million yen. The second
row shows the sectoral lending as a percentage of total lending. The third row shows
the change in outstanding loans as a share of beginning of the period asset. This is
our measure for evolution of bank lending over time. The standard deviation of the
change in loans as a share of beginning of the period assets are in parenthesis.
In Panel 2-b we provide the mean lending of City banks by sectors and periods.
Data source: Assets and liabilities report of banks from Bank of Japan and the
time series on lending by sectors also from Bank of Japan.
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Table 2-c: Descriptive statistics: lending by Regional banks
Regional Banks
Housing
loans C&I loans
Non-residential
Real estate loans Total loans
Pre-liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 60596.846 194750.92 36431.732 720861.36
Share of total loans 1.73% 20.31% 7.65%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .03% .35% .13% 1.7%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.05%) (.55%) (.1% ) (2.15%)
Liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 80235.214 214598.96 80611.267 1045988.2
Share of total loans 7.67% 20.51% 7.67%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .09% .04% .16% 1.1%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.064%) (.4% ) (.15%) (1.81%)
Post Basel One period
Outstanding loans- Levels 131087.83 232651.71 121555.79 1323373.4
Share of total loans 9.9% 17.58% 9.18%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .16% -(.009%) .05% .31%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.13%) (.36%) (.11%) (1.49%)
Post Land Revaluation law period
Outstanding loans- Levels 225904.95 207863.89 128021.21 1338321.6
Share of total loans 16.87% 15.5% 9.56%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .28% -.12% -.01% -.2%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) .2% (.25%) (.08%) (1.05%)
Note: We subdivide the sample period of 1983:1 to 2003:4 into 4 sub-periods: pre-
liberalization period (1983:1 to 1985:4), Post liberalization period (1986:1 to 1992:4),
Post Basel I period (1993:1 to 1998:4), and Post Land Revaluation Law period (1991:1
to 2003:4). For each sub-periods, the rst row shows the amount of domestic loans
outstanding by sector of Japanese banks measured in 100 million yen. The second
row shows the sectoral lending as a percentage of total lending. The third row shows
the change in outstanding loans as a share of beginning of the period asset. This is
our measure for evolution of bank lending over time. The standard deviation of the
change in loans as a share of beginning of the period assets are in parenthesis.
In Panel 2-c we provide the mean lending of Regional banks by sectors and periods.
Data source: Assets and liabilities report of banks from Bank of Japan and the
time series on lending by sectors also from Bank of Japan.
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Table 2-d: Descriptive statistics: lending by Second Tier Regional
banks
Second Tier Regional Banks
Housing
loans C&I loans
Non-residential
Real estate loans Total loans
Pre-liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 32186.692 57605.41 25725.816 306809.64
Share of total loans 10.48% 18.77% 8.37%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .07% .1% .19% 1.04%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.12%) (.46%) (.14%) (2.26%)
Liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 44282.75 59169.612 47534.191 422060.59
Share of total loans 10.49% 14.02% 11.25%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .13% .02% .17% 1.1%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.12%) (.23%) (1.17%)
Post Basel One period
Outstanding loans- Levels 69338.875 62758.917 60958.167 522796.04
Share of total loans 13.26% 11.99% 11.66%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .2% -.024% .04% .22%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.15%) (.28%) (.12%) (1.41%)
Post Land Revaluation law period
Outstanding loans- Levels 94120.421 48392 53947 464352.63
Share of total loans 20.27% 10.42% 11.61%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .1% -.16% -.11% -1.01%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.2% ) (.24%) (.27%) (1.64%)
Note: We subdivide the sample period of 1983:1 to 2003:4 into 4 sub-periods: pre-
liberalization period (1983:1 to 1985:4), Post liberalization period (1986:1 to 1992:4),
Post Basel I period (1993:1 to 1998:4), and Post Land Revaluation Law period (1991:1
to 2003:4). For each sub-periods, the rst row shows the amount of domestic loans
outstanding by sector of Japanese banks measured in 100 million yen. The second
row shows the sectoral lending as a percentage of total lending. The third row shows
the change in outstanding loans as a share of beginning of the period assets. This is
our measure for evolution of bank lending over time. The standard deviation of the
change in loans as a share of beginning of the period assets are in parenthesis.
In Panel 2-d we provide the mean lending of Second Tier Regional banks by sectors
and periods.
Data source: Assets and liabilities report of banks from Bank of Japan and the
time series on lending by sectors also from Bank of Japan.
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Table 3: Assets, Protability and equity and land evaluation g-
ures by bank types
Aggregate
over all
banks
City banks Regional banks
Second Tier
regional banks
Pre-liberalization period
%  change in asset 1.87% 2.16% 1.8% .88%
%  change in profits 2.62% 3.2% 2.32% 1.33%
Liberalization period
%  change in asset 2.19% 2.31% 2.13% 1.79%
%  change in profits 2.83% 3.25% 2.03% 2.47%
Post Basel One period
%  change in asset 1.16% .2% -3.3% .82%
%  change in profits -2.1% -1.98% -.09% -2.5%
Post Land Revaluation law period
%  change in asset .15% .3% .29% -.85%
%  change in profits -1.6% -.05% .04% -.37%
Equity revaluation as a
percentage of assets
.17%
-.0003% .48% .06%
Land revaluation as a
percentage of assets
.28% .29% .25%
.3%
Note: We subdivide the sample period of 1983:1 to 2003:4 into 4 sub-periods: pre-
liberalization period (1983:1 to 1985:4), Post liberalization period (1986:1 to 1992:4),
Post Basel I period (1993:1 to 1998:4), and Post Land Revaluation Law period (1991:1
to 2003:4). We trace the percentage changes in assets and protability aggregated over
all banks and by bank types during the subperiods. In the post Land Revaluation
Law period, we also have data on equity revaluation and land revaluation which we
list as a share of the beginning of the period asset. The Land Revaluation Law allowed
45% of the land revaluation gures to be counted towards Tier 2 capital to meet the
Basel capital requirements.
Data source: Assets and liabilities report of banks from Bank of Japan.
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Table 4: Results of regressing the change in outstanding loans as
a share of assets: domestic lending by Japanese banks on relevant
explanatory variables (Equation 1)
Determinants of domestic lending by Japanese banks
Dependent
 variables
Change in
aggregate loans
divided by asset
(1)
Change in non-
residential real estate
loans divided by asset
(2)
Change in
housing loans
divided by asset
(3)
Change in C&I
loans divided by
asset
(4)
Constant .28*** (3.4) .06***(2.62) .04**(2.94) .003(.13)
Q1 -.02*** (8.31) -.0004(-1.36) -.0004**(-2.52) -.006***(-13.3)
Q2 -.02***(-10.7) -.001***(-4.97) -.0007***(-3.07) -.005***(-11.8)
Q3 -.002(-1.36) -.0003(-1.5) .0002(1.11) -.002***(-3.55)
City .03***(3.59) .007***(3.06) .003**(2.26) -.0002(-.06)
Reg1 .02***(3.75) .005***(3.05) .002**(2.38) .0007(.4)
Loans by non-Japanese banks .08**(2.14) .002(.28) .012**(2.04) .01*(1.88)
Asset -.02***(-3.45) -.005***(-2.97) -.002**(-2.58) .00005(.03)
GDP -.08(-1.21) -.004(-.5) .007(.94) -.02(-1.44)
Confidence .0004*(1.91) .0001(.13) .00004(1.12) .00008*(1.8)
Liberalization .005(1.42) .002***(3.29) .001***(3.04) -.003***(-3.31)
Basel One .0003(.02) .0003(.05) -.01***(-4.45) .0003(.08)
Basel99 -.01(-.53) -.004(-.86) -.0002(-.07) -.01**(-2.57)
Tier 1 -.63(-1.22) -.14(-1.2) -.29***(-3.97) -.02(-.16)
Tier1*Basel1 .16(.33) .1(.83) .37***(5.53) -.14(-.94)
Tier1*Basel99 .7(1.53) .23**(2.02) .27***(4.13) .03(.24)
Eqreval*Basel99 -.16(-.38) -.12(-1.33) .16(1.38) -.02(-.32)
Landreval*Basel99 -.3(-.09) .85(1.05) -1.72**(-3.2) 2.06***(3.64)
Loanloss -.69(-.37) .004(.007) -.59**(-2.53) -.24(-.61)
Loanloss*Basel1 .07(.04) -.07(-.13) .7***(3.06) .11(.27)
Loanloss*Basel99 .2(.11) -.08(-.17) .51**(2.29) .21(.56)
R-squared .67 .5 .34 .62
Observations 248 248 248 248
SSR .02 .0005 .0003 .001
SER .009 .0014 .001 .002
Note: The time period under consideration is 1983:1 to 2003:4. All the explanatory
variables except for loans made by non-Japanese banks in Japan are beginning of the
period values. For loans made by non-Japanese banks, we take the change in loans over
a quarter divided by beginning of the period asset. Tier 1 is measured as the book-
value of capital divided by beginning of the period "unrisk-weighted" asset. Equity
revaluation, Land revaluation and reserves for loan loss are also calculated as shares
of beginning of the period asset. The regression method is OLS adjusting for xed
e¤ects. Values of t-statistics are in parenthesis
* signicant at 10%
** signicant at 5%
*** signicant at 1%
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Table 5: Results of regressing the percentage change in assets
and protability of domestic branches of Japanese banks on relevant
explanatory variables (Equations 2 & 3)
Determinants of assets and profitability of domestic branches of Japanese banks
Change in assets
(in levels)
Change in profits
(in levels)
Constant .67*** (3.8) .96 (.53)
Q1 .09*** (9.99) .09* (1.93)
Q2 .003 (.85) -.03 (-.27)
Q3 .08*** (10.21) .09* (1.82)
City .08*** (4.48) .03 (.16)
Reg1 .06*** (4.68) .11 (.97)
Loans by non-Japanese banks .14* (1.75) -1.87* (-1.86)
Asset -.05*** (-4.25) -.02 (-.21)
Change in asset/profit last
period
.25** (2.15) .48*** (2.72)
GDP -.1 (-.58) 2.23 (.66)
Confidence .0005 (1.34) -.003 (-.42)
Liberalization .02** (3.17) .002 (.06)
Basel One -.04 (-1.24) -.31 (-1.17)
Basel99 -.008 (-.32) -3.6*** (-3.87)
Tier 1 -2.16*** (-3.05) -21.6** (-2.38)
Tier1*Basel1 1.88** (2.33) 10.57 (1.31)
Tier1*Basel99 1.62** (2.58) 38.18*** (3.15)
Eqreval*Basel99 .09 (.09) 46.26* (1.77)
Land-reval*Basel99 .25 (.04) 834.18*** (3.49)
Loanloss -3.01 (-1.25) -22.11 (-.93)
Loanloss*Basel1 3.24 (1.29) 18.96 (.78)
Loanloss*Basel99 1.95 (.85) 35.02** (2.05)
R-squared .84 .28
Observations 241 241
SSR .06 19.47
SER .02 .3
Note: The time period under consideration is 1983:1 to 2003:4. All the explanatory
variables except for loans made by non-Japanese banks in Japan are beginning of the
period values. For loans made by non-Japanese banks, we take the change in loans over
a quarter divided by beginning of the period asset. Tier 1 is measured as the book-
value of capital divided by beginning of the period "unrisk-weighted" asset. Equity
revaluation, Land revaluation and reserves for loan loss are also calculated as shares
of beginning of the period asset. The regression method is OLS adjusting for xed
e¤ects. Values of t-statistics are in parenthesis
* signicant at 10%
** signicant at 5%
*** signicant at 1%
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics on US lending by branches of Japanese
banks classied by sectors
Table 6-a: Descriptive statistics: aggregate over all branches of
Japanese banks in US
Aggregate over all Japanese bank branches in
US
Real estate
loans C&I loans Total loans
Pre-liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 1470007 2122941 17653670
Share of total loans 8.32% 11.06%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets .18% 1.74% 1.74%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.17%) (4.09%) (5.62%)
Liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 20191030 51621979 17653670
Share of total loans 17.42% 48.4%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets .67% 1.74% 3.39%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.56%) (2.61%) 5.2%
Post Basel One period
Outstanding loans- Levels 20688542 70406170 12200000
Share of total loans 17.37% 62%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets .18% 1.74% 1.74%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.17%) (4.1%) (4.6%)
Post Land Revaluation law period
Outstanding loans- Levels 2857214 50141417 71407475
Share of total loans 4.02% 70.15%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets -.16% -.43% -.93%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.17%) (2.16%) (2.4%)
Note: In row one we provide the average amount of loans in United States by
sector of Japanese banks measured in 100 million yen. In row 2 we look at the share
of real estate loans and C&I loans in aggregate lending and in rows three and four,
we provide the evolution of bank loans by sector where the variable of interest is the
change in outstanding loans as a share of beginning of the period asset. Note that
for United States, we do not get enough data points for housing loans separately. We
subdivide the sample period of 1983:1 to 2003:4 into 4 sub-periods: pre-liberalization
period (1983:1 to 1985:4), Post liberalization period (1986:1 to 1992:4), Post Basel I
period (1993:1 to 1998:4), and Post Land Revaluation Law period (1991:1 to 2003:4).
In Panel 6-a we provide the mean lending of all US branches of Japanese banks by
sectors and periods.
Data source: Call reports led by Japanese banks operating in US according to
FFIEC 021 forms. For US operations we do not separate out the non-residential real
estate loans and loans to housing as data on housing loans and loans against home
equity are not separately led by the foreign banks in US including Japanese bank
branches.
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Table 6-b: Descriptive statistics: aggregate over all branches of
Japanese City banks in US
City Banks
Real estate
loans C&I loans Total loans
Pre-liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 1297277 1461095 11228507
Share of total loans 11.54% 13%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets .29% 1.21% .32%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.29%) (2.6%) (6.5%)
Liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 10117548 24857505 50457836
Share of total loans 20.05% 49.26%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets .59% 1.67% 3.32%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.74%) (3.24%) (6.25%)
Post Basel One period
Outstanding loans- Levels 9510780 29850789 53327413
Share of total loans 17.82% 55.97%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets -.54% -.08% -.9%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.62%) (1.41%) (2.46%)
Post Land Revaluation law period
Outstanding loans- Levels 1257407 26920334 37492579
Share of total loans 3.35% 71.81%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets -.08% 1.41% 1.99%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.23%) (7.8%) (10.7%)
Note: In row one we provide the average amount of loans in United States by
sector of Japanese banks measured in 100 million yen. In row 2 we look at the share
of real estate loans and C&I loans in aggregate lending and in rows three and four,
we provide the evolution of bank loans by sector where the variable of interest is the
change in outstanding loans as a share of beginning of the period asset. Note that
for United States, we do not get enough data points for housing loans separately. We
subdivide the sample period of 1983:1 to 2003:4 into 4 sub-periods: pre-liberalization
period (1983:1 to 1985:4), Post liberalization period (1986:1 to 1992:4), Post Basel I
period (1993:1 to 1998:4), and Post Land Revaluation Law period (1991:1 to 2003:4).
In Panel 6-b we provide the mean lending of all US branches of Japanese City
banks by sectors and periods.
Data source: Call reports led by Japanese banks operating in US according to
FFIEC 021 forms. For US operations we do not separate out the non-residential real
estate loans and loans to housing as data on housing loans and loans against home
equity are not separately led by the foreign banks in US including Japanese bank
branches.
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Table 6-c: Descriptive statistics: aggregate over all branches of
Japanese Regional banks in US
Regional banks
Real estate
loans C&I loans Total loans
Pre-liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 12302.38 128501.1 1760366
Share of total loans .7% 7.3%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets .09% 3.3% 7.09%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.17%) (8.49%) (15.32%)
Liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 1968420 5828139 11215931
Share of total loans 17.56% 51.98%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets .67% 1.39% 2.49%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.76%) (2.28%) (3.61%)
Post Basel one period
Outstanding loans- Levels 2083304 4490676 8447440
Share of total loans 24.66% 53.13%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets -.97% -2.2% -9.8%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (1.17%) (3.16%) (14.96%)
Post Land Revaluation law period
Outstanding loans- Levels 566 174416 604058.5
Share of total loans .17% 28.86%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets -.23% 2.39% 7.46%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.5% ) (5.6%) (6.91%)
Note: In row one we provide the average amount of loans in United States by
sector of Japanese banks measured in 100 million yen. In row 2 we look at the share
of real estate loans and C&I loans in aggregate lending and in rows three and four,
we provide the evolution of bank loans by sector where the variable of interest is the
change in outstanding loans as a share of beginning of the period asset. Note that
for United States, we do not get enough data points for housing loans separately. We
subdivide the sample period of 1983:1 to 2003:4 into 4 sub-periods: pre-liberalization
period (1983:1 to 1985:4), Post liberalization period (1986:1 to 1992:4), Post Basel I
period (1993:1 to 1998:4), and Post Land Revaluation Law period (1991:1 to 2003:4).
Most of the Japanese Regional banks had ceased their US operations (either by closing
the branches or mergers) by 2000.
In Panel 6-c we provide the mean lending of all US branches of Japanese Regional
banks by sectors and periods.
Data source: Call reports led by Japanese banks operating in US according to
FFIEC 021 forms. For US operations we do not separate out the non-residential real
estate loans and loans to housing as data on housing loans and loans against home
equity are not separately led by the foreign banks in US including Japanese bank
branches.
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Table 6-d: Descriptive statistics: aggregate over all branches of
Japanese Second Tier Regional banks in US
Second Tier Regional banks
Real estate
loans C&I loans Total loans
Pre-liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 32131.38 85482 288138.2
Share of total loans 11.14% 29.66%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets -.2% 3.1% 1.37%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.12%) (7.28%) (4.78%)
Liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 32131.38 85482 288138.2
Share of total loans 22.07% 66.53%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets 6.26% 20.1% 29.04%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (31.53%) (30.42%) (50.26%)
Post Basel One period
Outstanding loans- Levels 295118.2 889697.6 1337450
Share of total loans 7.73% 89.57%
Changes in outstanding loans as a share of assets -1.77% -2.56% -5.09%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (4.45%) (9.93%) (16.71%)
Note: In row one we provide the average amount of loans in United States by
sector of Japanese banks measured in 100 million yen. In row 2 we look at the share
of real estate loans and C&I loans in aggregate lending and in rows three and four,
we provide the evolution of bank loans by sector where the variable of interest is the
change in outstanding loans as a share of beginning of the period asset. Note that
for United States, we do not get enough data points for housing loans separately. We
subdivide the sample period of 1983:1 to 2003:4 into 4 sub-periods: pre-liberalization
period (1983:1 to 1985:4), Post liberalization period (1986:1 to 1992:4), Post Basel I
period (1993:1 to 1998:4), and Post Land Revaluation Law period (1991:1 to 2003:4).
Most of the Japanese Second Tier Regional banks had ceased their US operations
(either by closing the branches or mergers) by 1996 so Land Revaluation Law would
not a¤ect their US lending operations..
In Panel 6-d we provide the mean lending of all US branches of Japanese Regional
banks by sectors and periods.
Data source: Call reports led by Japanese banks operating in US according to
FFIEC 021 forms. For US operations we do not separate out the non-residential real
estate loans and loans to housing as data on housing loans and loans against home
equity are not separately led by the foreign banks in US including Japanese bank
branches.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics: aggregate over all branches of non-
Japanese banks operating in US during 1980 to 2003
Non-Japanese bank branches operating in US
Real estate
loans C&I loans Total loans
Pre-liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 318.24167 358.3 1056.7083
Share of total loans 30.16% 33.83%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .41% .48% 1.35%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.18%) (.36%) (.71%)
Liberalization period
Outstanding loans- Levels 687.6 490.6 1738.25
Share of total loans 39.65% 28.27%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .58% .008% .65%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.3% ) (.27%) (.7% )
Post Basel one period
Outstanding loans- Levels 1066.21 546.7 2324.08
Share of total loans 45.87% 23.47%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .52% .3% 1.2%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.25%) (.21%) (.5% )
Post Land Revaluation law period
Outstanding loans- Levels 2133.95 819.9 4004.72
Share of total loans 53.27% 20.39%
Changes in outstanding loans
as a share of assets .96% .12% 1.26%
(standard deviation in parenthesis) (.51%) (.27%) (.67%)
Note: In row one we provide the average amount of loans in United States by
sector of non-Japanese banks measured in billions of dollars. In row 2 we look at the
share of real estate loans and C&I loans in aggregate lending and in rows three and
four, we provide the evolution of bank loans by sector where the variable of interest is
the change in outstanding loans as a share of beginning of the period asset. Note that
for United States, we do not get enough data points for housing loans separately. We
subdivide the sample period of 1983:1 to 2003:4 into 4 sub-periods: pre-liberalization
period (1983:1 to 1985:4), Post liberalization period (1986:1 to 1992:4), Post Basel I
period (1993:1 to 1998:4), and Post Land Revaluation Law period (1991:1 to 2003:4).
Data source: Call reports led by commercial banks in US led according to FFIEC
031 forms
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Table 8: Results of regressing the change in outstanding loans in
US (by sectors) as a share of beginning of the period asset of Japanese
bank branches.
In Specication 1, the dependent variable is the change in out-
standing loans as a share of beginning of the period assets of US
branches of Japanese banks.
Determinants of Japanese Bank Lending in Un ited States over the period
Specification One: Dependent variable is the change in outstanding loans as a share of beginning of the period
asset
Dependent
variables
Change in aggregate
loans divided by
asset
(1)
Change in real estate
loans divided by asset
(2)
Change in C&I loans
divided by asset
(3)
Constant 1.65 (1.24) 0.31 (1.11) 1.42 (1.24)
Q1 -0.011 (.6) 0.0002 (.06) -0.009 (.54)
Q2 0.11 (.94) 0.024 (.98) 0.075 (.79)
Q3 -0.012 (1.006) 0.0007 (.33) -0.017 (1.46)
City 0.055 (1.02) 0.011 (.98) 0.01 (.36)
Reg1 -0.039 (.53) -0.01 (.68) -0.09 (1.19)
Reg2 -0.27 (1.28) -0.048 (1.07) -0.24 (1.3)
Loans by non-Japanese banks -10.14 (.92) -2.28 (.99) -6.79 (.83)
Asset -0.09 (1.17) -0.017 (1.06) -0.071 (1.14)
GDP 4.37 (.90) 1.148 (1.16) 4.8 (1.1)
Confidence -0.001 (.86) -0.0003(.97) -0.001 (1.43)
Liberalization 0.21 (1.23) 0.05 (1.32) 0.14 (1.37)
Basel One 0.12 (.82) 0.026 (.86) 0.081 (.82)
Basel99 -0.011 (.11) 0.009 (.67) -0.025 (.34)
Tier One -0.016 (1.34) -0.003 (1.1) -0.009 (1.3)
Tier1*Basel 1 -1.59 (.86) -0.37 (.95) -1.26 (.86)
Tier1*Basel99 -2.17** (2.5) -0.31 *(1.9) -0.69 (.99)
Tier2*Basel1 -1.61 (.86) -0.37 (.95) -1.27 (.86)
Tier2*Basel99 -2.19 **(2.53) -0.32*(1.03) -0.7 (1.03)
R-squared .06 .06 .06
Observations 283 287 287
SSR 63 2.65 29.1
SER .45 .1 .36
Note: The dependent variable is the change in loans by branches of Japanese
banks over a quarter as a share of beginning of the period asset, that we refer to as
specication one. The time period under consideration is 1980:1 to 2003:4. All the
explanatory variables except for loans made by non-Japanese banks are beginning of
the period values. For loans made by non-Japanese banks, we take the change in loans
over a quarter divided by beginning of the period asset. The regression method is OLS
adjusting for xed e¤ects. Values of t-statistics are in parenthesis.
* signicant at 10%
** signicant at 5%
*** signicant at 1%
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Table 9: Results of regressing the change in outstanding loans in
US (by sectors) as a share of beginning of the period asset of Japanese
bank branches.
In Specication 2, the dependent variable is the deviation of change
in outstanding loans as a share of beginning of the period assets of
US branches of Japanese banks from the change in outstanding loans
as a share of assets of branches of non-Japanese banks in US
Determinants of Japanese Bank Lending in United States over the period
Specification Two: Change in loans by Japanese banks in US as a share of beginning of the per iod asset Change
in loans by non-Japanese banks in US as a share of beginning of the period asset
Dependent
variables
Change in aggregate
loans Japanese
banks divided by
asset-Change in non-
Japanese lending
divided by asset
(1)
Change in real estate
loans divided by asset-
Change in non-
Japanese real estate
lending divided by asset
(2)
Change in C&I loans
divided by asset-
Change in non-
Japanese C&I  lending
divided by asset
(3)
Constant 1.53 (1.29) 0.29 (1.17) 1.38 (1.31)
Q1 -0.009 (-.49) 0.0006 (.18) -0.007 (-.42)
Q2 0.12 (.93) 0.025 (.96) 0.081 (.79)
Q3 -0.005 (-.38) 0.002 (.89) -0.009 (-.64)
City 0.047 (1.05) 0.009 (.97) 0.008 (.32)
Reg1 -0.028 (-.45) -0.008 (-.66) -0.078 (-1.33)
Reg2 -0.18 (-1.39) -0.027 (-.97) -0.18 (-1.56)
Asset -0.069 (-1.23) -0.01 (-1.06) -0.057 (-1.26)
GDP 4.68 (.93) 1.185 (1.15) 4.57 (1.11)
Confidence -0.006 (-1.18) -0.001 (-1.33) -0.005 (-1.17)
Liberalization 0.25 (1.20) 0.053 (1.21) 0.17 (1.29)
Basel One 0.16 (.91) 0.033 (.93) 0.099 (.87)
Basel99 0.034 (.33) 0.017 (1.19) 0.008 (.10)
Tier One -0.014 (-1.33) -0.002 (-1.01) -0.008 (-1.35)
Tier1*Basel 1 -1.78 (-.91) -0.41 (-1.02) -1.38 (-.89)
Tier1*Basel99 -2.45** (-2.49) -0.41** (-2.14) -0.88 (-1.06)
Tier2*Basel1 -1.79 (-.91) -0.42 (-1.02) -1.39 (-.89)
Tier2*Basel99 -2.46** (-2.5) -0.41** (-2.13) -0.89 (-1.08)
R-squared .05 .05 .06
Observations 283 283 283
SSR 63.76 2.69 29.47
SER .49 .1 .36
Note: The dependent variable is the (change in loans by branches of Japanese
banks over a quarter as a share of beginning of the period asset-change in loans by
non-Japanese banks over a quarter as a share of beginning of the period asset), that we
refer to as specication two. The time period under consideration is 1980:1 to 2003:4.
All the explanatory variables are beginning of the period values. The regression
method is OLS adjusting for xed e¤ects. Values of t-statistics are in parenthesis.
* signicant at 10%
** signicant at 5%
*** signicant at 1%
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Figure 1: Historical index of average urban land prices and the
stock prices (TOPIX) in Japan
Land and Stock Prices
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Note: TOPIX and the Land price index in 2000 is taken as 100
Data source: Japan Land Research Institute and Tokyo Stock Exchange
Looking at Figure 1 we nd that land prices started declining since 1991 and by
1998 were almost half of their value in 1991. Even then, the land price in 1998 is much
higher than the land price in sixties or seventies. Stock prices follow a similar trend
but they are much more volatile than land prices. The downturn of the stock market
preceded the downturn of land prices by 2 years.
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